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ENDING SUBSIDIZED DEGRADATION
The Ocean Dumping Example

Brenda Asher Dillmann
G~\

652, Major Paper

December 17, 1984

God has lent us the earth for our life.

It is a great entail.

It belongs as much to those who are to come after us as to ourselves, and we have no right by anything we do or neglect, to
involve them in any unnecessary penalties, or to deprive them
of the benefit which was in our power to bequeath.
John Ruskin
As quoted in CONSERVATION QUOTES
National Park Service
January, 1953

We know that isolated societies with very low levels of technology do not greatly damage their natural environments.

We

also know that our high technology society is handling our
environment in a way that will be lethal for us.

~fuat

we

don't know and had better make haste to test, is whether a
high-technology society can achieve a safe, durable and improving relationship with its environment.
FORTUNE MAGAZINE
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I. INTRODUCTION
Overview New York "Bi gh t Pollution
Since the dawn of time, the oceans have been a source of life to mankind.
Her waters have supplied him with food, clothing, and tools.

No less im-

portant, they have been a source of folklore, of poetry, of beauty and adventure.

The oceans with their tides . and their rhythms are the pulse of

the planet.

They are the cradle in which life first rocked.

earth's water flows towards the sea.

All of the

Here it evaporates, falls back to the

earth, drains towards the rivers, and flows once a gain to the sea.
do to our sky, our land and our rivers, so we do to our oceans.

l{hat we

They are

the catch basins for all of the abuse which man inflicts upon his planet.
There is no way to measure, on a global scale, the pollution dumped
directly into the oceans, let alone a l l the tens of thousands of contaminants that enter through the back door.

Over 20,000 tons of particulates,

toxics, and gaseous substances are added each day to the atmosphere surrounding the New York Bight.

1

It is anyone's guess as to what percentage

of these pollutants find their way via rainfall into the waters of the Bight.
As rain washes the land, contaminants such as synthetic organics, petrochemicals, and heavy metals wind their way through streams and rivers into the
Bight.

It is estimated that runoff accounts for 39 % of oil and grease pollu-

tion within the N.Y. Bight.

2

Chemical manufacturing firms such as DuPont and Allied Chemical are
responsible for much of the chemical contamination of the Bight.

Contami-

nants selected for ocean dumping are generally those considered too toxic
for land disposal.

"The most toxic wastes dumped are those resulting from

Allied Chemical's manufacturing processes for rubber chemicals, paper chemicals, water treating chemicals, organophosphate insecticides, mining chemicals
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and surfactants."

3

An estimated 640,000 pounds of PCB's, largely the result

of dumping by General Electric, contaminate the sediments of the Hudson

'
4 Last year, despite a Congressionally-mandated ban on the ocean
Rlver.
disposal of sewage sludge, 8.3 million tons of sludge was dumped just twelve
miles off the N.Y./N.J. coastline. S

Add to this the 220 million gallons of

" h arge d d a il y i nto t h e Hu d son an d East
raw sewage d lSC

R"lvers,6

h
" some
trow
ln

sweltered venom and seeping rot, and the N.Y. Bight becomes one stinking pot,
If the weight of all the pollutants added to the N.Y. Bight estuary are
combined, the loading approaches one ton of contaminants per

.

acre of estuarine bottom.
in the last decade.

7

~veek

for each

Many of these contaminants were only developed

It is difficult to a ssess the immediate and acute effects

that these chemicals have upon organisms inhabiting the marine environment.
It is virtually impossible for anyone to predict the more subtle, interactive
effects that these pollutants will have upon ecosystem stability and human
health.

Recent trends in waste management h ave come to recognize the so-

called "huge assimilative capacity" of the oceans as a was t e disposal medium.
We cannot yet, however, correctly monitor the impact of this dumping nor
. assess the assimilative carrying capacity of the ocean.

In short, we are

setting the stage for ecological disaster.
Externalities
As the population of this planet approaches the six billion mark, the problems associated with externalities become magnified.

Externalities are

spillover effects whereby the consequences of someone's voluntary actions,
in this case environmental degradation, are inflicted upon someone else.
Ocean dumping, for instance, provid es a cheap alternative for industry and
municipalities but adversely affects fisheries, recreation, and oceanassociated tourism.
-2-

Market exchanges, the buying and selling of goods, is a voluntary , mutually beneficial transaction.

Unlike a market exchange, an environmental ex-

ternality is neither mutually beneficial nor voluntary.

It is a parasitic

relationship, whereby the polluter furthers his cause by reducing the value
of the resource for others.

If this degradation is allowed to proceed to

the breaking point--the point at which the oceans, the earth, and the air
can no longer cleanse themselves--we would have a parasitic relationship in
which the parasite has killed its host.

According to ecological survival

theory, this would also result in the death of the parasite.
no winners.

There would be

If we stop and do a simple projection of where our course is

taking us, it is frightening.

In our polluted streams, lakes and estuaries,

hundreds of different kinds of contaminants interact with each other:

pes-

ticides and herbicides, bacteria and viruses, heavy metals, synthetic
organics, and radioactive wastes.

Our ingenuity coupled with our myopia

enables us to create 2,000 new chemicals a year.
runs into the tens of thousands.
synthetic chemical organics.
pounds.

8

The list of toxic chemicals

In 1940, we produced 1.3 billion pounds of

By 1978, this figure had soared to 320 billion

At this rate of production it becomes impossible to adequately

assess the effect of these chemicals upon our health and the environment.
With its high acidity, even life-sustaining rain has become a sort of environmental cancer.

Nuclear and toxic waste pile up, bio-accumulate, a nd

create nightmares like Love Canal.

Meanwhile, resource managers banter back

and forth about the most cost effective means of waste disposal.
The initial question should not be one of waste disposal, but of waste
reduction and utilization.

There are human survival costs which will even-

tually, if not belatedly, transcend conventional economics.

The time is

ripe for a new approach to waste mana gement in which the costs of diseconomies, waste recycling, and pollution research and abatement are incorporated
-3-

into product cost.

An analogy might help to elucidate this position.

Be-

cause of slavery, wages in conventional Roman economics were not incorporated
into product costs.

Today it is the environment that is held in chains.

So long as the economic incentive to pollute remains, pollution will
continue.

Product costs will be deceptively low because they do not take

into account environmental diseconomies or pollution-control-related government expenditure.

We must move towards a new global economics that does not

exploit the environment as a free resource.

We must search for ways in

which the social costs associated with environmental deterioration can be
fairly met and evaluated by the market system.
Purpose of Paper
The aim of this paper is to develop a user fee framework for the ocean dumping of municipal sludge.

Such a proposal requires a radical departure from

the standards and enforcement approach of today's legislation.

Municipal

sludge as defined in H.R. 4829 means any "solid, semi-solid, or liquid waste
generated by a wastewater treatment plant of a sewage authority or other
unit of state or local government".9

The ocean dumping of municipal sludge,

while accounting for only a small percentage of the total waste dumped into
the Bight, has proven deleterious environmental and economic consequences.
It has been in the public, judicial, and Congressional limelight.

Because

of its high visibility, any policy changes related to the economics of
sludge disposal will set a precedent not only for other areas of ocean dumping, but for environmental policy in general.

The issue of ocean disposal

of sludge serves well as a launching pad for the rethinking of economics as
it relates to environmental policy.
This paper will overview the legislative and judicial histories of the
ocean dumping of municipal sludge.

Particular attention will be given to

-4-

the role of EPA in regulating ocean s l udge disposal under the Marine Pollution Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA)
Control Act (FHPCA). 11

10

and the Federal Water Pollution

In an attempt to set the stage for a user fee pro-

posal, the ·po l i cy blunders of EPA in water quality issues will be discussed.
These blunders are directly related to EPA's adherence to the standards and
enforcement (regulatory) approach of environmental protection.

This ap-

proach will be criticized on both environmental and economic grounds.
Sewage-related ocean dumping budgets of f ederal agencies \vill be examined
and the categorical costs of ocean dumping management tabulated.

Using as

a guideline evolving techniques in implementation and enviromnent al management theory, a framework under which a user fee program could operate will
be developed.

This user fee program will be based not only on co sts in-

curred in permitting, site designation, research, and compliance, but will
include the environmental externalities associated with ocean dumping.

It

will be an attempt to "internalize" diseconomies by factoring them into the
product costs.

12

Such a proposal will require a departure from the stan-

dards and enforcement approach to environmental protection.

In making the

case for a new approach towards environmental regulation, this paper will
provide the theoretical, philosophical and economic basis for such a departure.

II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

General
Before discussing future ocean dumping policy, it is necessary to bring the
past into perspective.

EPA in its implementation of both the

MPRSA has been thwarted with implementation "inadequacies".

TI~CA

and the

FoLl.owLng a

brief legislative background of the ocean dumping of municipal sludge, goal
modifications relating to both acts will be discussed.
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More importantly,

the reasons for failing to achieve specified goals will be addressed.

This

is done in an effort to avoid the same pitfalls in the current proposal.
In 1970 the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), in response to
public pressure and a sharp rise in the amount of ocean dumping, completed
a report calling for strong domestic and international legislation to regulate ocean dumping.

At the time there was little hard scientific research

with which to quantify the deleterious effects of ocean dumping.
studies, however, indicated that impacts could be severe.

Related

The CEQ report

noted that serious information deficiencies existed and that broad-based
ecological research was needed.
Today many people consider the CEQ report to be unsubstantiated.

13

Sci-

entific data accumulated over the past fourteen years has led some investigators to believe that the oceans have a n underutilized capacity to assimilate waste.

14

Others feel that the crude ability of science to detect and

monitor, much less correct, problems associated with waste disposal prohibits us from pursuing a permissive ocean disposal policy based upon rudi. '1
'
.
mentary aSSlml
atlve
capaclty
mo d e l'lng. 15

Congress, h owever, was receptlve
.

to CEQ's recorrunendations, and in 1972 the MPRSA was passed.

Due to juris-

dictional problems within Congress, the MPRSA applied only to waters outside
of the three-mile .t e r r i t or i a l sea.

The territorial sea, along with states'

internal waters, was to be governed by FWPCA.

Generally speaking, vessel

dumped sludge is governed under Title I of the MPRSA.

Eff luent piped from

publically owned treatment works (POTW's) and discharged into rivers, bays,
or estuaries is regulated under the FWPCA.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
The FWPCA, first passed in 1948, has a long history of amendments designed
to make the bill a more effective means of pollution control.

-6-

The 1972

amendments changed the focus of the bill from one of ambient water quality
standards to one of technology-based effluent standards.

Under the ambient

water quality standards approach, in-stream concentrations for various water
quality parameters were established.

It proved impossible, using in-stream

concentrations as the sole criteria, to relate a decline in water quality
to a particular discharge.

In 1972 Congress, seeking to limit the discharge

of piped wastes into rivers and estuaries, made it illegal to dump without
a permit.

The 1972 amendments appeared to be a more manageable approach to

water pollution control because they required no direct link between a pollution source and water quality.

More important, perhaps, is the fact that

the "no discharge goal " for 1985 shifted emphasis away from waste treatment
as an acceptable use of water.

"This legislation", according to its authors,

"would clearly establish that no one has the right to pollute--that pollution continues because of technological limits, not because of any inherent
right to use the nation's waterways for the purpose of discharging of
wastes.,,16
goal.

July 1, 1983, was established as an interim fishable/swimmable

Under the 1972 amendments, the requirements for industry and publi-

cally owned treatment works (POTW's) were different and are outlined in
Table 1.
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permits (NPDES) were
to be issued to all municipal and industrial dischargers in the U.S.

The

permits were to establish specific limits of the amount of discharge and
set up timetables for compliance with the aforementioned deadlines.

Under

the amendments EPA was assigned the tas k of establishing effluent standards
for any substance that might cause death, disease, genetic mutations, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, and the like.

Limits for 65 major toxic

pollutants were included in each NPDES permit, and more than 60,000 of these
permits had to be issued. 17

Where interest warranted it, a public hearing

-7-

TABLE 1
Goals of the

F~~CA

Amendments 1972

Goal

Means

Pollution Source

Date

Industry,
point source

Best practicable control
technology available
(BPT)

Same as means

7/1/77

Industry,
point source

Best available technology
economically achievable
(BAT)

Fishable/

7/1/83

sw.immab Le waters

Same as means

7/1/77

Best practicable treatment technology over life
of the plant (BPT)

Fishable/
swimmable waters

7/1/83

(BPT)

Zero discharge

7/1/85

POTW's

Effluent limitation based
. on secondary treatment

POTW's

Industry,
point source
POTW's
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regarding permit stipulations had to be held.

If the discharger was not

satisfied with pollution levels, timetables discharge amounts, fines to be
levied, etc., the permit could be, and often was, contested in the courts.
Due in large part to EPA's discretional authority, NPDES permits for
municipal treatment plants were vrritten in such a way as to preclude 60% of
the nation's 21,000 sewage treatment plants from achieving secondary treatment by 1977.

18

In 1974 only 3,400 of the nation's POTW's were in compliance

with established effluent standards, leaving 17,600 plants whose discharge
had to be improved in order to meet the 1977 requirements.

There were an

additional 1,500 cities that had no treatment facilities at all. 1 9

To fur-

ther complicate the logistics of the problem, it appeared that the 18 billion
dollars allocated for municipal plant construction was insufficient to
achieve the 1977 goal.
Many argued that the standardized requirement of secondary treatment
showed little foresight on the part of Congress~O Has it reasonable that a
small community of 1,000 people should be subjected to the same standards
and a greater per capita expense than a city of 100,000 people?

Was it

reasonable to assume that marine and inland waters required the same degree
of protection, or that the waste assimilation for all water bodies was identical?

It was argued that in many instances the 1983 goals of fishable/

swimmable could be achieved without the added expense of secondary treatment.
The economic hardships of fugitive business and the construction and
operation costs of secondary treatment plants gave coastal municipalities
the incentive to fight for the passage of the 1977 FWPCA amendments.

The

301(h) waiver, which was part of these amendments, provided a mechanism
whereby a coastal community could on a case-by-case basis apply for an
exemption to the secondary treatment requirement.

-9-

Passage of the amendments

was Congress' signal to EPA that a uniform national standard was not the
best solution.

Initially, the regulations promulgated under Congressional

mandate were so complex that they precluded many municipalities from even
completing the application.

In 1981, however, Congress mandated that the

applications be reopened under revised (relaxed) regulations.

Several addi-

tional communities have since applied for waivers.
The Marine Pollution Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA)
In 1972 the MPRSA was passed to regulate dumping beyond the limits of the
territorial sea.

Title I of the Act covers the permitting program, Title II

governs ocean dumping research, and Title III establishes the Marine Sanctuaries Program.

Title I sought to regulate, prevent, or strictly limit the

,dumping of any material into ocean waters "which would adversely affect
human health, welfare or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological
.
. l'ltles
, ,,21
sys t ems, or economlC
potentla
.

Title II, on the other hand, estab-

lished a comprehensive research program "for the purpose of determining
means of minimizing or ending all dumping of materials within 5 years of
the effective date of the Act".22

As a result of these varying approaches,

the EPA has been criticized by industrialists and environmentalists alike.
EPA adopted a policy where interim permits for the ocean dumping of
industrial waste and municipal sludge would not be granted after 1978, unless permitees showed a good faith effort to ph ase out ocean dumping by
1981.

December 31, 1981, was established as the deadline for ending the

dumping of any material which could unreasonably degrade or endanger human
health or the marine environment.

23

To assist industries and municipalities

in achieving this goal, EPA provided funding for research on alternative
technologies.
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In 1977, prompted by the 1976 sludge onslaught to Long Island beaches,
statutory authority was imposed on EPA's goal by the passage of the Hughes
Amendment.

This legislative mandate prohibited post-1981 dumping of munici-

pal sludge that would "unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, weL«
fare amenities, the marine environment, ecological systems or economic
potentialities" (emphasis added).24

EPA adamantly opposed the proposed ban,

calling it an invasion of the agency's discretional authority.

They felt

that they no longer had the ability to make decisions based upon evolving
technical, environmental, or economic data.

Congress, however, backed by a

constituency appalled at the 1976 s ludge disaster, felt that the EPA was
using its discretion to create delay and compromise in achieving pollution
abatement goals. ' I n 1980, further amendments to the MPRSA somewhat softene d
Congressman Hughes' 1981 deadline by suggesting that EPA "balance the impacts
of ocean dumping of sewage sludge against those of land disposal and select
the least harmful alternative, thus allowing an extension of the 1981 deadline if ocean dumping were found to be the least harmful". 25
As a result of the Hughes Amendment and EPA requirements under

}~RSA,

many major cities found adequate alternative solutions to the ocean disposal
of municipal sludge.

New York City, with the worst sludge disposal problem

in the country and its back up against the wall of Congressional mandate,
sought a court injunction to stop the order.

The resulting judicial verdict,

the so-called Sofaer decision, echoed the sentiment of the 1980
ments.

~~R SA

amend-

EPA, however, had not yet written those amendments into its ocean

dumping regulations.

The decision mandated that EPA, before prohibiting

ocean dumping, must weigh it on a case-by-case basis with alternative landbased solutions.

While wise in concept and perhaps necessary as an interim

measure, this court decision may prove to be a bureaucratic nightmare.

-11-

Despite continued Congressional prodding, EPA has yet to develop regulations
implementing the Sofaer decision.

III. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE TRENDS
Overview
Congress has grown impatient with EPA's inability both to promulgate regulations implementing the Sofaer decision and to expeditiously designate the
106-mile dump site.

Furthermore, Congress fears that, eventually, EPA's

interpretation of the Sofaer decision may give "the keys to the ocean dump"
to municipalities that have already found environmentally sound alternatives
to the ocean dumping of municipal sludge.

Washington, D.C., Philadelphia,

and Baltimore have already expressed renewed interest in the matter.

N.Y.

and several N.J. municipalities are currently dumping at the twelve-mile
site, under court order, but without permits.

The Merchant l·farine and Fish-

eries Conunittee has also expressed a concern that "the increasing interest
in ocean dumping may tax EPA's ability to process ocean dumping permit
applications, to monitor the effects of increased dumping, and to conduct
research to produce the information needed for management decisions.

In

addition, the potential for a substantial increase in the amounts and kinds
of material that might be dumped raises additional concern about the cumulative impacts of dumping.,,26

It is against this backdrop of discontent and

environmental concern that Congress has begun to act.
For the past two years, legislation has been introduced in Congress
which would, once again, spell out Congressional intent regarding the ocean
disposal of sewage sludge.

Congress feels that prolonged attempts by EPA

to resolve the problem of pollution caused by the ocean dumping of municipal
sludge have produced insufficient results.

In 1978 EPA established a policy

which would complete site designations by 1981.

-12-

In 1981 the Agency petitioned

Congress for additional funds towards ·t h i s end, but the site designation
process has yet to be completed.

EPA, making minimal headway in studying

and designating sites, has a history for extending indefinitely both municipal and industrial disposal sites.

Without adequate environmental assess-

ment (many of these sites were unstudied), such a policy could cause significant, irreversible harm.

Contributing to Congressional discontent is

the fact that EPA has yet to promulgate regulations implementing the Sofaer
decision.

Although EPA has recently announced a tentative denial of peti-

tions to redesignate the twelve-mile site, Congress feels that statutory
backing of this denial would reduce the risk for further delay.
The purpose of the current sludge dumping amendments (H.R. 4829) to
Title I of the MPRSA is to ensure the expeditious study and designation of
potential dump sites and to provide additional permitting and monitoring
criteria.

The amendments would also establish a N.Y. Bight Apex Restoration

Plan, a user fee proposal, and pretreatment requirements.

In addition, the

legislation would ·establish a firm deadline for the phaseout of all ocean
dumping of municipal sludge which could not meet specific requirements.

The

principle provisions of H.R. 4829 are highlighted below.
Principle Provisions of H.R. 4829
Municipal Sludge.

A new definition was created to avoid the confusion which

has resulted from the interpretation of the term "sewage sludge".

For the

purpose of the Act, municipal sludge is defined as "solid, semisolid, or
liquid waste generated by a wastewater treatment plant of a sewage authority
or other unit of state of local government".
Pretreatment Requirements.

Requires that municipalities seeking ocean dump-

ing permits after 12/31/86 be in compliance with Sections 307(b) and 402(b)
(8) of the FWPCA relating to the requirements for an effective and comprehensive pretreatment program.
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Sludge Quality Standards.

Within one year after date of enactment, the

Administrator is required to report to Congress on the technological and
economic feasibility of establishing and implementing quality standards for
the disposal of municipal sludge through either ocean- or land-based methods.
The quality standards shall set forth maximum permissible levels for heavy
metals.

PCB's, persistent plastics, microbiological constituents, pathogens,

and other materials found in municipal sludge.
Site Phaseout.

Requires EPA to end all dumping of municipal sludge within

the Bight Apex within eighteen months after the date of enactment or at the
earliest reasonable time after the designation of a deep water site, whichever is sooner.
Ban on New Entrants.

No new municipality may apply for a permit to dump

sewage sludge in the Bight Apex.

"Eligible Authorities" include only those

who on 11/2/83 were authorized under court order to dump municipal sludge
at the Apex site.
Site Designation.

EPA must establish a schedule of approval or denial for

those areas approved for ocean
approved before 7/1/82.

dum~ing

by court order and for those sites

The schedule must be submitted to Congress no later

than 180 days after enactment of the Act.

Obligates Administrator to desig-

nate dump sites, but first must analyze suitability of site for particular
disposal material, giving weight to both immediate and long-term effects.
Writ of Mandamus.

Courts, upon application of any person, can issue a Writ

of Mandamus directing the Administrator to implement in a timely manner the
site designation provisions of this Act.
Monitoring.

Must monitor effects of dumping at designated sites and must

predict in three-year intervals the extent of the expected dumping.

If the

Administrator determines t hat the dumpinG is no l onger suHablc, he/she must

-14-

reduce or terminate dumping at that site.

A quality assurance program would

be established to monitor the permit program, including on-site analysis,
sampling, and testing.
Permit Provisions.

Special provisions for permit applications that EPA can

require are expanded to emphasize disposal alternatives, recycling and reduction of contaminants.
Sludge Phaseout.

Requires the Administrator to consult with the Governor of

the appropriate state before issuing a permit.

A permit for the ocean dump-

ing of municipal sludge may not be issued after 12/31/86 unless the Administrator (after consultation with the governor) finds that a suitable landbased alternative is not available and that the applicant is in compliance
with appropriate pretreatment requirements.
London Dumping Convention.

To execute a non-self-executing treaty, the

amendments mandate adherence to the London Dumping Convention and its
Annexes .
. New York Bight Apex Restoration Plan.

Provides long-range comprehensive

planning to improve the water quality of the N.Y. Bight.

The plan would be

designed to address the numerous pollutants that are found in the Bight and
to develop pollution control strategies for the region.
Fines.

The fines for violation of the permit requirements are dropped from

$50,000 per offense and/or one year in jail to a maximum fine of $10,000
and/or six months in jail.
Fees.

The Administrator must collect an "application fee" in an amount com-

mensurate with the reasonable administrative costs incurred in permit processing (as opposed to permit issuing).

Federal agencies are exempt.

The

Administrator must also establish and collect fees from permittees to recover costs associated with the issuance of permits, including site designation, compliance, the assessment of the direct effects of dumping,

-15-

surveillance~ and enforcement.

This fee does not apply to dredge materials~

but only to permits issued under Section 102 of the MPRSA.

The monies

shall be deposited in the principal appropriation account, or accounts used
to carry out activities associated with the processing and issuing of permits.

This does not apply to

dredge.materials~

under Section 102 of the MPRSA.

but only to permits issued

The funds collected in association with

permit issuance may be transferred in part to the other Federal agencies
for the costs incurred or expected to be incurred in site designation,
direct effects assessment,
Funding.

surveillance~

and enforcement.

(1) Authorizes $5 million in fiscal years 1985-87 for the prepara-

tion of the N.Y. Bight Apex Restoration Plan (NYBARP).

Authorizes $40

million in each fiscal year beginning in 1986 to fund projects consistent
with NYBARP.

(2) Permits - Authorizes $4.25 million in fiscal years 1985-87

for the purposes and administration of Title I (other than NYBARP).
Reaction to Current Legislative Trends
The foregoing analysis of Congressional and agency actions in sludge and
wastewater

disposal~

together with a consideration of the reaction to cur-

.r e n t legislation, particularly the user fee provisions, will assist in the
development of a more workable and equitable approach of ocean sludge disposal management.

n.R.

The reaction of EPA and affected municipalities to

4829 has been somewhat less than favorable.

An agency given the task

of implementing legislation with which it does not agree will find ways to
both overtly and subtly undermine Congressional intent.

Ifhile 100% agree-

ment is rarely possible, concurrence on key issues will facilitate the
Act's implementation.

More often than not, however, achieving agreement

even on minor issues comes only through political bartering.
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The Army Corps of Engineers (COE), in typical bureaucratic territorial
fashion, has during all the reauthorizations of Title I of the MPRSA emphasized the importance of keeping dredge material separate from the discussion
of municipal sludge and free from all user charges.

During mark-up sessions

of H.R. 4829 and related legislation, the user fee proposed for dredge spoil
was dropped.

The COE would still, however, remain eligible to receive

monies collected through the sludge dumping user fee for the purpose of
dredge spoil site designations.

Regarding legislation similar to H.R. 4829,

the COE expressed an interest "that ocean dumping be allowed to continue
unimpeded, subject to necessary and reasonable environmental safeguards"
(emphasis added).27
New York and several New Jersey municipalities would be directly affected by the proposed legislation.

Generally speaking, "these municipali-

ties are strongly opposed to any legislation that eliminates the oceans as
a waste disposal option, and feel that a full range of sludge disposal
options should be left open".28

Costs involved in the transportation of

sludge to the 106 sight are expected to increase six-fold over the costs of
dumping at the twelve-mile site.

29

With New York City (NYC) alone accumu-

lating over 260 dry tons of sewage each day, this 1vould represent a significant 1ncrease 1n mun1C1pa 1 expendOt
1 ures. 30
o

0

o.

ThO.
1S 1ncrease d oes no t ·1nc 1 u d e

the $50 million necessary for upgrading sludge transport vessels.

Land-

based alternatives, investigated by NYC were found to provide at best, an
expensive interim solution.

Mayor Koch of NYC has expressed a concern that

there would be increased disposal costs with no significant environmental
gain.

The municipalities strongly opposed a user charge, proposed in earlier

legislation, which would have required a per tonnage pollution fee on all
barged sludge.

Seventy-five percent of this money would have been deposited
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by the municipalities in a trust account for the purpose of developing and
implementing "long-term alternatives to the disposal of municipal sludge by
ocean dumping, including alternatives utilizing resource recovery, recycling,
' t he rma l reduction, and composting ll 31

The monies could also have been used

for improvements in pretreatment, treatment, and storage techniques.

Despite

the fact that this proposal could have recycled the bulk of the charges back
into the city budget, it was viewed by the city as a pollution surcharge and
an unfair economic burden.
In recent testimony, Joseph McGough, Commissioner of the NYC Department
of Environmental Protection, testified in gene r a l support of H.R. 4829 and
gave conceptual approval for the user fee proposal.

He felt, however, that

the costs intended to be recouped through the user fee should be detailed.
The city voiced mixed support for the NYBARP but was opposed to the bias
that the plan had against the use of the twelve-mile site.

32

This apparent softening of NYC attitudes towards increased regulation
and eventual phaseout of sludge dumping within the Bight Apex is in part
attributable to EPA's recent announcement of a tentative denial to redesignate the twelve-mile site.

In addition, EPA has expressed support for user

fee provisions and has provided a general statement of how it will approach
future permit decisions in light of the Sofaer decision.
1. The Agency will, as an overall principle, protect the ocean from
significant adverse effects of waste disposal and will particularly assure
that they are not used for

II

c he apll waste disposal as a matter of short-run

economic considerations alone.
2. In any specific case, the Agency willilllow ocean disposal of a
waste only if the applicant can show that no practicable alternatives are
avaiiable that have less impact on the total environment.
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3. For the long run, the Agency will actively encourage environmentally
Lc i 1 approach es such as waste mlnlmlzatlon,
" ...
b ene f lCla
recyc 1"lng, or reuse. 33
EPA, content to maintain the status quo, feels, "The current Act provides a well thought-out framework for protecting the marine environment.
The present statute provides a flexible and workable approach for considering ocean disposal activities along with other waste disposal options, while
at the same time protecting our marine resources from unreasonable degradation.

We see no need to amend substantively the current statue beyond pro-

viding the Administrator discretion to adopt a user fee system for recovering the program costs of ocean disposal.,,34

(Emphasis added.)

EPA feels that many of the amendments either unduly restrict Agency
discretion or serve only to reiterate authority with the Agency already has.
The mandatory sludge phaseout date and the site designation provisions of
the Act would rescind much of the Agency's authority in the designation of
interim dumping sites.

Due to the scientific complexity and established

rule making procedures involved in site designation, EPA feels that policy
flexibility is an essential program ingredient.
come impatient with EPA on sludge issues.

Congress, however, has be-

It is their opinion that agency

discretion while oftentimes necessary has in this instance been used to
create delay and compromise in achieving incisive pollution abatement.

If

passed, H.R. 4829'would "channel" EPA's discretionary authority.
EPA feels that provisions such as the quality assurance program and the
entire NYBARP are unnecessary.

While supporting the concepts of such pro-

grams, the agency maintains that it has either already accomplished what
Congress is requesting, or is vested with the authority to do so.

Congress,

in proposing the Bight restoration plan, recognized the need for further
research and a coordinated approach for improving overall water quality · and
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marine resources of the Apex.

Regarding the NYBARP, it is EPA's opinion

that "sufficient planning has been completed and comprehensive control
measures are underway to significantly restore the Bight Apex waters and
(the agency) see(s) no need to do anymore studies on the Bight Apex itself.
It is already established and generally accepted that this is a highly
degraded area".

35

This position seems to indicate that the Bight is being

subjected to a politically induced environmental triage.

The scientific

community, on the other hand, notes several gaping holes in the N.Y. Bight
information base.

36

Scientific investigations into the NYB have generated

more questions than answers.

We are only now, for instance, beginning to

investigate the mobility and persistence of contaminants through the marine
ecosystem.

Conclusions drawn in many of the scientific papers are qualified

by statements such as, "insufficient background or correlative data and
limited understanding of dynamic ocean processes".37

These disclaimers are

conveniently overlooked when they do not suite that Administration's purpose.
EPA favors a user fee provision designed to recoup the direct costs
incurred in operating the ocean dumping program.

Jointly administered by

the EPA, COE, the Coast Guard, and NOAA, such costs would include permit
processing, monitoring, site designation, and enforcement.

EPA feels that

actions undertaken by the Federal Government which directly benefit the dispose~s

should be supported by the disposers themselves through the estab-

lishment of a user fee.

Under present policy, a taxpayer in Circle, Mon-

tana, is helping to subsidize sludge disposal in NYC.

The agency, unlike

Congress however, feels that the fees should be deposited in the general
treasury rather than in the principle appropriation account or accounts used
to carry out Federal activities under the Act.

Depositing revenues in the

general treasury would allow funds collected under the pretense of ocean
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dumping to be used for unrelated purposes (such as subsidizing a wheat
farmer in Circle, Montana).

In any user fee system, it is important that

fees are collected from those who benefit from the activity.

It is just

as vital, however, that the collected funds be distributed to those agencies
charged with the duty of researching, monitoring, and regulating said
. activity.
EPA strongly opposes any fee system that even faintly resembles a pollution surcharge.

In the agency's opinion, such a charge would go beyond

recouping expenditures and would impose a "penalty" for ocean dumping.

De-

spite the fact that the MPRSA mandates consideration of "economic potentialities", nowhere in agency comments is there reference to the use of a pollution
f ee to

0

'
38
"
"
ff set t h e d lseconomles
cause d b y ocean d
umplng.

Generally speaking, NOAA concurs with EPA's ideology regarding the
scope and purpose of a user fee.
about long-term effects.

NOAA, however, appears to be more concerned

They feel, "that activities that use the oceans

for waste disposal should be expected to pay the costs associated with regulating and monitoring the short- and long-term effects of that use ••• Failure
to establish this principle in effect provides an incentive and even a subsidy to continue the use of the oceans for this purpose, and thus a potential
to overuse it.,,39

NOAA also feels that it is unsound management practice to

impose a user fee on sludge dumpers and not also on industrial waste and
dredge material.
Both NOAA and EPA are of the opinion that the application of user fees
in regards to ocean dumping will help to assure adequate funding for regulatory and monitoring activities.

The question of user fees being used to

fund research, however, is a point of contention between Congress and the
agencies.

According to NOAA, much of the necessary research is generic in
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nature, covering broad geographic areas.

Consequently, it is difficult to

tie this research directly to the permit process.

It would be difficult,

for instance, to make a small group of localized municipalities financially
responsible for research which examined the entire eastern seaboard as a
region for waste disposal sites.

NOAA and EPA both maintain that certain

kinds of research benefit the general public more than the polluter.

The

costs of such research, therefore, should be funded through general taxes
and not a user fee directed towards a specific type of dumper in a specific
geographic area.

Polluters could be held accountable for research more

directly attributable to their own operation, such as site designation and
monitoring.
Research costs would be a major factor in determining cost allocations
involved in the development of a user fee proposal.

Unfortunately, deciding

which costs are directly attributable to the permit process and which costs
are generic in

na~ure

is not as cut and dryas it might seem.

In studying

the effects of pollutants on fish and shellfish resources, for instance, it
is not always possible to determine the input of sewage sludge versus other
pollutants.

The question of allocating research costs among dischargers

and taxpayers is a difficult one which must be resolved by separating site
specific from generic research.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION POLICY
Introduction
It is said that any wise policymaker knmvs "that his policies will achieve
only part of what he hopes and at the same time will produce unanticipated
consequences he would have pre f erre d to aV01'd" . 40

Policy is not the solu-

tion to a problem, but rather the result of compromise, competition, cooperation, and confusion.

It is molded not only by the players in the arena,
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but by the applause, hisses, and egg-throwing of the audience as well.

It

is partisan, subjective, parochial, and fosters an imbalance of power.
Theoretically, by proceeding through a series of incremental changes, imminent danger is mitigated and lasting mistakes are avoided.

While avoiding

mistakes may not be tantamount to comprehensive

p~anning,

short-term effec-

tiveness is the nature of the political beast.

To the constituency, long-

term planning translates into uncertainty, inaction and incompetency.
takes its toll at the polls.

It is

cri~is

It

heroics, superhero politics ...

and spiderman is forever running out of web fluid.

The challenge imple-

menters face is fashioning short-term glamour politics into the long-term
planning process.
In attempting to meet this challenge, I will examine some of the shortcomings of the regulatory approach towards environmental management.

The

underlying reasons for deficiencies will be discussed and organizational
remedies suggested.
The Regulatory Approach
Looking at the policy mistakes inherent in the FWPCA and the MPRSA in light
of evolving planning theory may prevent duplication of such TIlistakes in the
drafting and implementation of future legislation.

Both acts, and indeed

most environmental legislation, are characterized by the standards and enforcement (regulatory) approach to pollution abatement.

This approach must

pass through a series of five stages before a program can become operative.
The five stages of the regulatory approach, goal setting, criteria establishment, quality standards establishment, setting specific effluent standards and enforcement, involve a maze of actors, environments, and complex
technical information.

In addition, successful program implementation

relies upon the threat of sanctions, rather than the promise of incentives.
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Most of the environmental legislation of the seventies is patterned
after the classical model of decision-making as embodied by Weber (18641920).41

This is a highly rationalized approach where the explicit orders

of the upper offices are dutifully implemented by the lower offices .

In

this hierarchical model, the role of implementation is restricted to delivering in the form of policy outputs that which the policy formulators
have ordered.

Such a system may have worked well under the National Defense

and Interstate Highway Program of General Eisenhower's administration.

42

The process breaks down, however, in the politically and technically complex
Ifbargaining market lf of environmental policy.

According to Nakamura and

Smallwood, this classical model of policy production may be depicted as
follows:

43
Policy Formulators

1

(CHOOSE· AND INSTRUCT)

Policy Implementers

1

(DELIVER)

Policy Outputs

)

(STOP)

The flow chart of the five-step regulator approach towards environmental
legislation follows the linear classical model of decision making.

The arenas

in which the policies are formulated, implemented, and evaluated, however,
are circular rather than linear.

(See Fig. 1 next page.)

Inputs are received

from the formulators by the implemen ters and by lobby gr oups wishing to
influence both policy formulation and implementation.

By same token, inputs

are received by the implementers from the formulators and diverse interest
groups.

Policy formulation and implementation may not even be separate, let

along sequential. 45

Out of political, technical, and philosophical necessity,
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its worth.
place.

Unless both parties expect to gain, the exchange will not take

This market mechanism is defined as "the method of organization that

allows unregulated prices and decentralized decisions of private property
owners to resolve the basic economic problems of consumption, production,
and distribution".80

It functions as sort of "an automatic guidance system"

in an otherwise incomprehensible enigma.

If environmental regulation can be

designed to operate within the constructs of the market system, instead of
against them, its complexity would be reduced by an order of magnitude, and
therefore its chances of success proportionately increased.

81

In addition,

the "cruise control" of the market system would allow it to transcend political terms of office.
Placing environmental protection under the wings of the market place
will require initial government interference.

This is because environmental

problems are almost always associated with externalities, one of four recogLzed mar<et
1
f al
a i Lures. 82
nlze

Market failures are circumstances that prevent the

market from attaining ideal economic efficiency.

Spillover effects or exter-

nalities are present when the actions of one party affect the well-being of
another party without their consent.

When production imposes diseconomies

on secondary parties, there exists a subsequent overestimation of marginal
costs.

This results in an artificially low price and outputs that are higher

than those demanded by ideal economic efficiency.

Kapp, author of the book,

THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, maintains that the inclusion of
externalities within the traditional confines of economic analysis requires
a "reformation of the classical a nd neo-classical concept of wea.l.t h and
" . y ,,83
pro d uc t ava.t
•

He offers the following criticism of private enterprise

economics:
As soon as one passes beyond the traditional abstractions of neoclassical price analysis and begins to consider the neglected

-47-

Externalities run rampant in areas such as the oceans, where property
rights are poorly defined.
years ago.

"\~at

8S

Aristotle recognized this problem over 2,000

is common to many is taken least care of, for all men have

a greater regard for what is their own than for what they possess in common
with others. 1l86

Despite the fact that along with Aristotle, anyone who has

taken a beginning economics class has been exposed to these principles, there
seems to be little incentive on the part of the government to mitigate against
the effects of externalities in the market place.
Private property rights give o,vners sovereignty over their resources, so
long as their actions do not impinge on the public good.

Free enterprise

should not be interpreted as the right to destroy this heritage for profit.
The earth's heritage rightfully belongs to us all, and yet this is precisely
what happens when environmental diseconomies are not incorporated into the
market system.
The public sector has a responsibility to improve resource allocation
disrupted by environmental externalities.

Business must be forced to account

for costs associated with spillovers and resource management.

This will re-

quire initial manipulation of the market, for it is a cycle of greed that will
not be broken by the good intentions of the greedy.

The connection between

pollution and profit which currently exists in one conventional technologybased market economy must be broken.
There are essentially two schools of thought regarding the most efficient
way of alleviating the social costs of pollution in environmental planning.
The first, and mQst widely used, standards and enforcement approach has already
been discussed in detail.

The second approach relies upon pollution taxes

and user fees operating within the context of the market system and is preferred by economists and academics alike.
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87

The widespread view among

economists is that the more you can incorporate externalities into the cost
structure and the more options that you allow a resource user, the better.

88

User fees and marketable discharge permits are designed to channel a producer's self-interest towards policies designed to a ch i ev e both long-term
and short-term environmental goals.

89

Pollution taxes take into account

varying cost structures of different types and sizes of firms.

Some compa-

nies or municipalities can reduce emissions relatively cheaply, while for
others the costs are prohibitive.

Is it reasonable to impose waste reduc-

tions schemes that effectively force smaller competitors out of business?
Pollution taxes can offer alternative solutions to such dilemmas.
Under a pollution fee system, a maximum level of contamination is set
for a given area depending upon the area's desired uses.

New techniques in

cost-benefit analysis can provide methods for determining appropriate discharge levels. 90

Marketable discharge permits whose total values equal the

established level of acceptable pollution can be bought and sold among
industries and municipalities within the region.

The tax or discharge per-

mit induces those industries who can cut pollution emissions at the least
possible cost to do so.

Those industries finding it cheaper to pollute would,

through the pollution tax, compensate society for environmental damage.

Tax

monies can be used to help manage the resource, fund pollution control research, and to mitigate the effects of externalities.

Although the companies

or municipalities choosing to pay the pollution tax are given a "license to
pollute", the total level of pollution within the control region is not
likely to exceed the established amount.
'Re du c t i ons in the volume or toxicity of the discharge would free up a
firm's pollution rights for sale.

The rights become economic assets whose

prices are determined by the market sYstetn.
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The marketability of these

rights, together with the expense of a pollution tax, provide a polluter
with economic incentives to develop pollution control technologies.

The

temptation to cheat is less, because the rewards of working within the system
are greater than the rewards of working outside it.

Kneese and Schultz, two

economists working with Resources for the Future have estimated that user
fees could save society between 40 to 90 percent of current pollution control
costs.

90

Over the course of a decade, this represents a predicted savings of

between $100 billion and $225 billion dollars.

91

From an economic viewpoint

marketable discharge permits are far superior to the command and control
system which provides all sticks and no carrots. 92
Table 3 provides a comparison on key issues between the standards and
enforcement approach and the user fee system.

The major shortcomings of the

charge system are its newness and the possibility that ambient standards in
limited geographic areas of a pollution control region might be violated.

A

large number of small, polluting businesses, for example, might be located
along a given stretch of the coastal zone.

Since is was cheaper for each of

these companies to pay the pollution tax than to control their pollution, an
area of concentrated pollution would develop.

This increase in pollution in

one portion of the management region would be accompanied by a corresponding
decrease in pollution in other sections.
contend with.

Nevertheless, this is a problem to

One possible solution wouLd be to establish localized maximum

ambient standards within the pollution control area.

This would still allow

pockets of increased ambient pollution, but would establish maximum tolerable
levels.
Ortolando, in the following table, characterizes the effluent charge
approach as "unfamiliar and hard to understand ll •
rests not so much

w Lt h

I feel that the problem

its complexity as its "ncwnes a'",
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I n this paper I have

economic efficiency, environmental protection, and an equitable distribution
of costs.

92

Using state-of-the-art scientific information and an expanded

benefit-cost analysis, the regulator must set acceptable limits of pollution
in keeping with desired uses.

Those factors considered in a benefit-cost

analysis should incorporate externalities, aesthetics and opportunity costs,
as well as traditional cost items associated with the discharge and its
regulation.

Many economists feel that even with the latest techniques,

benefits are generally underestimated due to an inability to adequately assess
"matters of principle" associated tvith a clean environment. 93

Nevertheless,

it is important that attempts be made to include nonmonetary items into the
benefit-cost analysis.

Information derived from the benefit-cost analysis

should be used in establishing the number and the fee for marketable discharge
permits.

A fee set too low will have little or no effect in controlling

pollution, while one set too high will place an inordinate economic burden
upon area industries.
A vital step in implementing a pollution charge program is making sure
that a clear and legally enforceable statement governing the legal rights of
a permit holder exist.

Since pollution charges are used to alleviate exter-

nalities occurring in common resources, such a document will help clarify
the resource rights of different user groups.

Id eally, this legal statement

should also provide some means of legal recourse to those affected by environmental diseconomies.
Criticism of-the regulatory approach towards environmental regulation
began as a whisper at the outset of the ecology movement.

While the mention

of a pollution tax still sends shivers dotl1n the spines of narrow-minded
bureaucrats, liberals within the agencies are beginning to take kindly to
the idea.

They are pressing for new approaches which emphasize different
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implementation techniques, regulations and systems.

Even at higher levels

of the agency, user fees are favored as a means of recouping program costs. 94
In addition, some states have already supplemented their standard:3 and

. .
. h emlSSlon
en f orcemen t programs Wlt
c h arges. 95

With almost two decades of

mistakes behind us, that whisper is f i n a l l y becoming audible.
VI. USER FEES AND MUNICIPAL WASTES
Intro'duction
The ocean dumping of municipal sludge has known deleterious consequences.

In

1979, sludge dumping contributed to extreme environmental degradation in over
75

Km

2

of N.Y. Bight.

96

By the year 2,000 it is estimated that municipal

wastes will account for 24% of ocean dumped materials.

97

Sludge contains high

quantities of pathogens, heavy metals, and organic chemicals such as PCB's.
It is associated with a high incidence of fin rot in fish, contam inates shel lfish beds, and radically alters the benthic community in and around the dumpsite.

98

Table 4 illustrates the relative importance of municipal wastes as

.
'
.
I events. 99
causatlve
agents f
or varlOUS
enVlronmenta

Although these effects

are serious and should be mitigated against, sewage sludge, depending on the
parameter being measured, accounts for only 5-15% of the pollution in the
Bight.

100

To illustrate the management potential of user fees I have used

the ocean dumping of sludge as an example.

In the Bight, improvements due

to implementation of a user fee on municipal sludge would almost certainly
be masked by other pollution sources such as dredge spoil, sewer plant dis' ch a r ge s , and chemical wastes.
Over 14 million people live in the co astal rim of the N.Y. Bight.
half this number live within the city's limits.
commodity and water is cheap.

10 l

About

Sewage is a low demand

The city alone uses 1.5 billion gallons of

water per day, and 2,500,000 gallons of both treated and untreated sewage is
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TABLE 4. Municipal Waste Discharge and Effects.
Relative Importance:
Nitroren
BOD

Trace
organics

L

= low,

M = medium, H

= high.

Petroleum
hydrocarbons

Metals

Trace
nutrients

Chlorine

H

L
L
M
H
M
L

L
M
H
H
M
L

M
M
L
L
L
L

L
L
L
L
L
L

Pathogens

EFFECTS
Anoxic events
Red tides
Fin erosion
Damaged benthos
Damaged fisheries
Damaged beaches 2

I
VI
VI
I

H
H
L
M
M
M

L
H
H
H
L

M

L

H

L

L

M

L

N

L

H

M

M

M

L

H

L

1'1

L

H

H

H

L

H

H

1-1

H

L

L

L

L
L
M
L
H

SOURCES
P.:1-W

sewage

discharges
Combined sewer
over f Lows

Sewage treatment
plant effluents
Sewage sludge
dumping

1Biochemical oxygen demand.
2Including aesthetic and health considerations (e. g. , the presence of floatables and
suspended matter).
From:

Gunnerson et al., 1981.

discharged into the Bight.

10 2

In order to effect beneficial environmental

change, user fee programs must foster conservation and reuse and must infiltrate virtually all facets of protection.
One of the benefits of a u ser fee in ocean dumping is that it would
bring the issue into economic parity with other dumping alternatives.

The

current multi-media appro ach to waste management of weighing the potential
impacts of disposal in one media with the projected impacts of disposal in
another is a sound management strategy.

103

When one option, however, is

significantly lower in price than all other dumping options, decisions are
apt to be made solely on the basis of conventional economics.
fee, the true costs of dumping remain hidden.
pusposes.

Without a user

A user fee would serve four

It would (1) bring ocean dtunping into economic parity with other

disposal options;
ment regulation;

(2) recoup program costs associated with necessary govern(3) encourage the development of resource conservation,

.
hn i
104 an d (4) a dd ress
reuse an d .
lnnovatlve
pretreatment an d d ilsposa 1 tec1nlques;

the effect of externalities on resource-related opportunity costs.
In this section some of the logistical and economic factors involved in
establishing a user fee will be examined.

While this section will not attempt

to set a dollar amount for a user fee, it will look at some of the factors

.. .I
necessary to ma k e suc h a d etermlnatlon.

The economic factors considered

include expenses incurred directly by the municipalities, and Federal costs
associated with site designation, monitoring, enforcement, research and permit
processing and issuance.

In addition, some of dumping's external affects on ·

the resource-based industries of the Bight will be examined.
Establishing a user fee should be based upon an in-depth co st-benefit
analysis of appropriate elements.

This task is well beyond the scope of this

paper and the expertise of its autho r.
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A specifjc dollar amount arrived at

Figure 1

ENVIIWNMENTS INFLUENCING IMPLEI\'lENTATION

/q-c;J",
0-0-0
Environm eru II ;
Policy Irnplcmcru arion

From:

Nakamura, Robert and Frank Smallwood. 1980. THE POLITICS OF
POLICY nWLEMENTATION. St. Martins Press, New York, p. 27.

goals are oftentimes ambiguous and subject to varying interpretation by
Congress, implementers, interest groups, and the courts.

More often than

not, interpretation is based not upon facts, but upon political pursuasion.
Agencies such as NOAA and EPA are technically responsible for the
implementation of environmental legislation which Congress has enacted.
Nevertheless, they playa vital role in the fashioning of policy in both
the formulating and implementating arenas.

Agencies bargain with Congress

and each other over policy means and goals.

Policymakers delegate broad

discretionary authority to implementers to refine the conceptual goals of
the act and to develop the necessary means to achieve them.

This dis cre-

tionary authority is coveted by the agencies and through rule-making used
to formulate policy specifics.

In light of this power , it could be argued

that agencies playa greater role in policy formulation than does Congress.
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What we have then is a policy model, the standards and enforcement
approach, structured in a linear, classical fashion.

It is a model which,

although designed for implementation in a hierarchical, militaristic system,
is being implemented amidst the chaos of partisan mutual adjustment.

If

long-term planning objectives are to be achieved, it is imperative that the
limitations to the paradigm of rational planning be recognized.

Procedural

and substantive elements of planning theory must be integrated into the
political/policy system in a manner that reflects the multiplicity of input-

· kages. 46
output 1 In
The next section will examine some of the policy mistakes inherent in
the FWPCA and the MPRSA.

The information from this analysis will be used

when incorporating current planning theory into the design of a user fee
proposal for the disposal of municipal sludge.

It is hoped that an approach

which recognizes the limitations of the system within which it operates and
takes into account past mistakes of similar policies will have a better
chance of approaching stated policy goals.
Analysis of Policy Mistakes
Looking at the policy mistakes inherent in the FWPCA and the

~~RSA

may help

to avoid such mistakes in the drafting and implementation of future legislation.

The shortcomings of both acts are due, in part, to a failure of

both Congress and EPA to adequately consider how the means were to influence
the goals.

In addition, EPA, prompted on one side by environmentalists and

on the other by industrialists, generally seems to choose the path of least
resistance.

In the interest of keeping the peace and maintaining the status

quo, EPA has never ventured into the realm of creative policy-making.

The

concepts of user fees and effluent charges have been around since the late
.
.
i
sixties, yet only now is EPA beglnnlng
to conSlLd er t heelr
utlLl.Lt
l y. 47
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The fact that EPA is always reactive and never proactive is due in part
to the nature of the partisan mutual adjustment system.
to learn from past mistakes, however, is unforgivable.

A chronic failure
Despite the valuable

hindsight afforded them, EPA continues to rely exclusively upon a procedurally
cumbersome and technologically complicated regulatory approach.

EPA's imple-

mentation of the FWPCA has been called "an epic in the way of technical, political and bureaucratic obstacles in the way of grand designs".48

Let us

briefly examine some of these "obstacles" in the hopes of achieving the "grand
designs" of a clean ocean and environmentally sound solutions to our waste
disposal problems.
Under the FWPCA and the MPRSA, inappropriate incentive structures were
created by a reliance upon the regulatory approach.

49

The scope and com-

plexity of this approach is so convoluted that, more often than not, it works
to the

discharger~ benefit.

The technical and procedural complexity of the

permit process far exceeds the monies necessary to implement the program.

As

previously mentioned, EPA was assigned the task of setting limits for sixtyfive toxic pollutants about which little, if anything, was known.

In addi-

tion, over 60,000 permits had to be issued designating pollutant levels and
compliance schedules.

If a party was not content with the requirements of

their permit, they had the option of seeking relief from the courts.

Because

of the excessive workload, there was a tendency to prosecute the industrial
dischargers, while ignoring municipal offenders.

Even with this policy, it

. was possible to bring enforcement action against only about half of the industrial noncompliers.

With odds such as this, it was (and still is) cheaper

for the discharger to "take his chances" rather than install pollution control equipment.
Two enforcement alternatives which have been used by EPA to encourage
compliance with NPDES and ocean dumping permits are the threat of civil
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and/or criminal penalties and economic sanctions.

The problems with relying

upon a punitive system such as this rather than an incentive system are the
expense, time, and loss of the final authority in litigation.
factors decrease the probability of i mpl eme n t a t i on success.

All of these
~1ajor

court

case.s such as New York City v s , EPA can dramatically change Congressional

and agency intent regarding policy interpretation and implementation.

Liti-

gat ion almost always removes the final decision from EPA to the courts.

As

a result, penalties imposed for similar offenses will vary from court to
court and judge to judge.
ensure compliance.

Moreover, these enforcement alternatives do not

Fines and legal fees are often minor sums when compared

to the costs of installation and operation of pollution control equipment.
Given the track records of the MPRSA and FWPCA, it would appear that the
principle incentive of the standards and enforcement approach is not one of
abatement, but of continued pollution.
Both Congress and EPA have a history of failing to consider means-end
relationships in policy implementation and formulation .

On this basis,

technology-based standards as a means of " r e s t or i ng and maintaining the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's water" has been
·
t h e su b ]ect

0

f much crltlclsm.
...
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BPT standards were to be the means by

which the U.S. was to achieve "fishable and swimmable" waters by 1983.

BAT

standards which were supposed to be in effect by 1983 were to result in zero
discharge by 1985.

The standards were applied un iformly across the board

with little thought as to the relative i mpa c t on water quality improvement.
No consideration was given to the fact that a small factory or POTW contributing only 1% of the pollutants in a gi v e n river was required to i ns t a l l
the same degree of treatment as a large operation contributing 99% of the
pollutants.

Furthermore, there was no analysis of the costs of complying
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1

with the standards in terms of the benefits that could be expected.
ing to one critic, technology-based standards from an economic

Accord-

vie\~oint

"are virtually certain to result in higher than necessary costs for any particular level of water quality.

There is nothing in the logic or the proce-

dure for setting technology-based limits to assure that the conditions for
cost minimization will be satisfied."Sl
Stringent effluent limitations should have been enforced in areas where
the environmental and economic return was the greatest.

In areas where the

gain from strict and costly pollution controls was minimal, the standards
should have been relaxed to the point of optimum return.
(and similarly zero

dump~ng)

Zero discharge

for nonpersistent organic contaminants may prove

to be economically unsound and environmentally unnecessary.

The costs for

achieving zero discharge rise exponentially as 100% removal is approached.
Such a policy refuses to recognize the fact that the assimilative capacity
for different water bodies varies.

Just as uniform BPT guidelines were

applied to broad industrial categories, the zero discharge policy was applied
to all water bodies, regardless of their physical. chemical. and biological
differences.

Selective application of BPT and BAT standards where they would

do the most good. coupled with a program where pollution rights within a
given management basin could be bought and sold, would have been a more
effective and innovation approach.
The FWPCA and the MPRSA are both insistent on strong Federal leadership
in establishing standards and deadlines for state and municipal compliance.
The FWPCA set up an explicit compliance schedule for achieving the very
general goals of BPT and BAT.

Agreement as to exactly what constituted BPT

or BAT for varying industries has not yet been reached.

This stems from the

fact that the legislation pressed technology by mandating pollution control
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abatement measures which were not yet in existence.
legislation may accelerate technological innovation.

Technology pressing
JFK's promise of the

early '60's to land a man on the moon is perhaps the best example of this
principle in action.

In the case of the FWPCA, however, the Congressional

mandate was not backed with sufficient monetary resources or pollution
abatement incentives.

The ultimate result was confusion as to exactly what

was required, where, and when.

Without knowing these three things, imple-

mentation of any policy is difficult.
In the case of the MPRSA, Congress established a firm cutoff date for
the ocean disposal of municipal sludge.

It left the means for achieving

these goals up to the municipalities, but provided them with insufficient
monetary or environmental incentives for carrying out the policy mandate.
While some cities managed to find adequate solutions to their disposal
problem, New York--the city with the highest disposal rate--could not.
While the 1981 litigation stemming from New York's inability and unwillingness to comply has set in motion three years of convoluted political bartering, no solution lies in sight.

If the chances of program success are

inversely proportional to the number of actors and decision points, then
pollution control via the regulatory approach is off to a slow start indeed.
In this section I have highlighted some of the principle reasons for
program failure under the MPRSA and the FWPCA.

These and other shortcomings

spin a common thread throughout most of our environmental regulations.

The

following checklist summarizes the reasons for program failure discussed in
this analysis.

In addition, it includes some common pitfalls inherent in

other environmental and social legislation.

In drafting new policy, it is

imperative that the policymaker have an understanding of which factors increase and which factors decrease the chances for pro gram success.
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Summary of Common Implementation Pitfalls
- Technical and procedural complexity, excessive number of decision points
necessary to reach final implementation--i.e., in NPDES permits, limits
had to be set for 65 major pollutants about which little was

kno~m.

Some

60,000 of these permits had to be issued, and then monitored for compliance.
Regulations are so complex that they prevent goal achievement.
- Excessive workloads, inadequate funding to accomplish stated goals--i.e.,
funding insufficient to promote alternative technologies.

Compliance moni-

toring and timely permit proces sing impossible with limited staff provided.
- Frequency of litigation, number and nature of entry points by courts into
the system.
Number of parties involved in policy formulation and implementation, number
and strength of viewpoints represented.
Inability to interpret vague le gislative goals, varying interpretations of
legislative intent.
- Inability to implement specific goals, given vague or technically unavailable means.
- Changing political climate.
- Abandoning unpopular goals in favor of those with greater support, thereby
changing original intent of legislation.
- Failure to consider means-end relationships.
- Improper economic analysis--i.e., failure to consider plant op eration costs
along with plant construction costs, failure to consider economic diseconomies, reliance upon sanctions versus incentives.

Inconsistent and inappro-

priate fines, coupled with slight probability of getting caught, makes it
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cheaper to pollute than to not pollute.

Reliance upon grant structure

distorts economic picture.
- Lack of creativity in policy formulation.
Reliance upon a "rational" policy model in an "irrational" implementation
arena.
- Unintended and unanticipated side effects produced by legislation.

Often-

times these side effects help to undermine the original intent of the
legislation--i.e., sewers, originally constructed for the purpose of improving water quality, spurred rapid and unplanned urban expansion, with a
resultant decrease in water quality.
Determing role of science--i.e., basing major policy decisions upon inadequate scientific information.

Deciding to what degree scientific informa-

tion is to influence policy; deciding when scientific information is sufficient to make policy choice; choosing between dichotomous scientific viewpoints; choosing direction and nature of future r esearch.
- Political obstacles to technical evaluation.
- Dominant personalities involved in implementation and formulation processes.

V. POLICY FORMULATION
Introduction
Hindsight can be a valuable tool if it is used to make mid-course corrections.
In the case of Congress and the regulatory agencies, however, hindsight has
not mitigated their myopic attitudes towards long-term environmental policy.
Just as the nature of the problems facing this nation on the environmental
front are changing, so must the framework for problem solving.

The regula-

tory 'approach, based almost exclusively on rational planning theory, is well
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suited to programs such as highway development where the goals are "concrete"
and agreed upon.

In the muddied waters of environmental policy, however, the

system has consistently proven itself inadequate.
Having discussed some of the mistakes inherent in past policies and the
reaction to pending legislation, let us now plug this information into the
context of current planning theory.

The time has come for the paradigm of

comprehensive, regulatory legislation to make way for a more productive,
creative approach towards policy formulation.

This new approach must also

address the inadequacies of nondirectional, incremental implementation by
I

taking into account both the short- and long-term goals associated with
. environmental protection.
Planning Theory
The "planning technique" facilitated by a partisan democracy is inextricably
tied to the electoral process.

\Vhile this ensures some measure of account-

ability, solutions are geared to the political term of office.

~Vhat

we are

left with then is a "band-aid" approach to problem solving, which relies
upon short-term solutions for long-term problems.

This system, referred to

as partisan mutual adjustment, relies upon incremental improvements and
policy corrections.

It recognizes, among others, the following shortcomings

of the comprehensive, rational approach as espoused by Weber:

52

1. Although logical in its paper organization, it is impractical
in its implementation.
2. This approach assumes a rational relationship between ends and
means.
3. In all but the most simple of problems, the approach is beyond
human cognitive powers.
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4. In an attempt to analyze all options in an open system of
variables, resources will be exhausted before a decision is met.
5. Assumes clear, concise goals that will be implemented in a prescribed manner without question or discretion.
This is not to say that rationality has no role to play in policy formulation.

Goal setting, identification of key policy alternatives, evaluation

of means versus ends, and implementation of decisions are practical tasks
. which must be addressed in some form.

Comprehensiveness, however, must be

tempered with the political and economic realities of the system within which
it operates.

If it is not, it will thwart policy implementation, which is

in and of itself the policymakers' principal rationality.
Partisan mutual adjustment (disjointed incrementalism), although a natural by-product of our political system, was not even considered to be a valid
planning technique until the late '60's
mo d e 1 h as

..

s~x

.

As advanced by Charles Lindblom, the
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pr~mary requ~rements:

1. Rather than attempting a comprehensive survey and evalution of all
the alternatives, the decision-maker focuses only on those policies
which differ incrementally from existing policies.
2. Only a relatively small number of policy alternatives are considered.
3. For each policy alternative, only a restricted number of "important"
consequences are evaluated.
4. The problem confronting the decision-maker is continually redefined:
Incrementalism allows for countless end-means and means-end adjustments which, in effect, make the problem more manageable.
5. Thus, there is no one decision or "right" solution, but a "never
ending series of attacks" on the issues at hand through serial
analysis and evaluation.
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The incremental approach has been referred to by some as "pre-inertia
and anti-innovation".54

When used by itself, it is a remedial approach

"geared almost exclusively to the alleviation of specific problems, rather
than the promotion of future goals".55

In theory, because there is no cen-

tral decision-making institution and because the majority of decisions are
incremental, the system compensates for individual inadequacies.

Agreement,

rather than validity or utility. is the measure of a "good" decision.

56

The principal weakness of the incremental system, lack of long-range
planning. coincides with the principal strength of the r ational-comprehensive
approach.

Disjointed incrementalism seeks no more than "incremental" varia-

tions from past policies.

Accumulation may, in time. lead to substantial

change, but there is nothing in the incremental approach to guide the small
changes in anyone direction.

Steps may be circular, may backtrack. or may

wander in many different directions at once. but with no particular destination in mind.

Incrementalists, because they focus on short-term solutions,

neglect basic societal innovations.

If a problem requires future planning

or rapid reform. it will not be dealt with effectively.

By the same token.

if the initial direction is \VTong. as is the case in the standard and enforcement approach to environmental regulation. inertia will prevent timely policy
reform.

Boulding. in a review of Lindblom's A STRATEGY OF DECISION, suc-

cinctly evaluates this approach.

"\~e

stagger through history like a drunk

.
..
d·lncrementa I oot
ff
puttlng
one d ilsJolnte
a ter anot h er ,,57
.
In 1967, Etzoni in his mixed scanning model, recognized the need to combine the strengths of comprehensive-rational planning with the strengths of
disjointed incrementalism in order to compensate for the inherent weaknesses
of each. 58

The mixed-scanning model, unlike incrementalism, acknowledges

that the cumulative impact of incremental decisions is greatly affected by
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its relationship to the underlying fundamental decision.

The fundamental

decision to end ocean dumping harmful municipal sludge by 1981, for example,
set into production a series of incremental decisions by a wide spectrum of
actors that brough ocean dumping policy to where it is today.

It is impor-

tant, therefore, that these fundamental decisions are informed decisions.
Etzoni recognized the need for different levels of policy analysis.
Some issues require comprehensive investigation, while others require only
a cursory evaluation.

While a policymaker is studying one facet of an issue

in depth (the one considered most crucial), he should have his feelers out
in other levels and should be operating within the context of a fundamental
policy.

Maintaining both a wide angle and a telephoto lens in policy formu-

lation and implementation will improve one's chances of achieving long-range
goals.
Unlike the incrementalists, mixed scanners believe that agreement is
not the sole measure of a · l l g o o d ll policy.

Gaining consensus on incremental

changes is easier than gaining support for a new policy.

However, a policy

which continually relies upon consensus as the sole evaluative criteria
implies that several goal concessions have been made.

A policy such as this

will accomplish less than necessary, later than necessary.

Major change

will not occur until the cumulative shortcomings of incremental change have
made additional incremental change politically unwise.

The louder the grum-

bling, the greater the chance for a paradigm change.
The mixed-scanning model believes it reasonable to assume that decisionmakers are capable of summarizing and ranking their values, at least on an
ordinal scale.
ability.

This assumption facilitates evaluation and enhances account-

According to Etzoni, II(Each) of the two elements of mixed-scanning

(rationality and incrementalism) helps to reduce the particular effects and
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shortcomings of the other.

Incrementalism reduces the unrealistic aspects

of rationalism by limiting the details required in fundamental decisions.
Contextuating rationalism helps to overcome the conservative slant of incrementalism by exploring longer-run alternatives.

Together, empirical tests

and comparative study of decision-makers would show that these elements make
for a third approach which is at once more realistic and more effective than
its components."

59

Since Etzoni and Lindblom, a number of other planning theories have come
to light.

Among these are allocative planning, advocacy planning, middle-

range planning, innovative planning, transactive planning, and radical plano
n~ng.
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1
Each of these panning
styles has evo 1ved out of a need or situation

not recognized by a previous style.
Another new direction in management theory is the increasing importance
. po 1 ~cy f
latlon
'
Ol ementat~on.
.
61
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sector groups are neither public nor private in nature.

Third

Rather, they have

risen out of the inadequacies and inequities of public and private bureaucracies.

According to Theodore Levitt in his book, THE THIRD SECTOR: NEW TACTICS

FOR A RESPONSIVE SOCIETY, their main purpose is to "do things business and
goverrunent are either not doing, not doing well, or not doing often enough".
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Third sector groups initially started out as passive charities, whose duty
it was to patch the gaping holes left by the other two sectors.

This included

such things as handouts to the homeless and the development of land sanctuaries
for public enjoyment.

Recently, the emphasis of third sector groups has

f
.
shifted from one of " passive patching"
to one
0
actlve
re f orm. 63

Activist

third sector environmental groups include the Natural Resource Defense Council,
the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, and the National Wildlife Federation.
On the subject of ocean dumping, the National Wildlife Federation has been

-37-

the most vocal.

64

The fact that there has been such a proliferation of

third sector environmental groups is perhaps indicative of the fact that
the current standards and enforcement approach towards environmental regu.
. 1na
. d equate. 65
1 at10n
1S

While the purpose of this paper is not to discuss and analyze planning
styles, it is important to realize that alternative planning styles exist.
Problems are not only varied in nature, but the same problem is perceived
differently by different constituent groups.

Planning style must reflect

the constituency, the nature of the problem, and the arena in which the established problem _s ol v i n g framework is to be implemented.

Although assuming

that a single planning method will function well under all conditions is
foolhardy, this is precisely what policymakers have done with environmental
regulation.

Worse yet, they have structured rational, comprehensive policies

(standards and enforcement approach), which must be implemented within a
disjointed, incremental, partisan environment.

This could be likened to

driving a car down the railroad tracks, instead of down the road that runs
parallel to the tracks.

People seem genuinely dismayed when legislation's

stated goals are not achieved.

Given the radically different nature of the

legislation and the system within which it must be implemented, they ought
to be amazed that there is any progress at all.
Death of a Paradigm
Galloway and Mahayani have drawn an analogy between planning models that have
evolved in the past twenty-five years and the process of paradigm change in
the physical sciences as presented by Thomas Kuhn.

66

Kuhn believes that di-

rectional change in scientific thought "are generated periodically when
existing theories (paradigms) are recognized as being inadequate to explain
the anomalies which manifest themselves randomly in the course of normal
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He goes even further in suggesting that it is

the anomalies themselves that initiate scientific breakthroughs.

Kuhn has

developed a five-step process of paradigm change whi.ch can be summarized as
follows:
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1. The Preparadigm Period:

This phase is characterized by lack of con-

sensus and competing schools of thought.
2. Paradigm Development:

One "sufficiently unprecedented" paradigm

begins to · gel and attract supporters from other competing schools.
Its supporters then refine and further define paradigm concepts.
3. Paradigm Articulation:

The paradigm itself articulates research

parameters and problem solving techniques.
4. The Postparadigm Period:

This is the phase in which the paradigm

flaws first become obvious.

Paradigm believers will attempt to

modify the paradigm in order to explain the anomalies.
5. Paradigm Crisis:

The paradigm has outlived its useful life, and

paradigm modifications can no longer account for theory's shortcomings.

Existing theories are gone over with a fine tooth comb, and

research parameters are broadened.

This leads to a new preparadigm

period and eventually to paradigm substitution.
One can look upon the standard and enforcement approach to environmental
regulation in much the same way that Galloway and Mahayani looked upon com-

.
1 an d use p1
·
69
pre h enSlve
annlng.

Both theories rely heavily upon the rational

approach to planning and both theories are in a state of paradigm crisis.
If the mid-eighties is the era of paradigm crisis for rational policymaking, then the early seventies was the era of paradigm articulation.
Several pieces of legislation which passed during this period were based
upon the "rational" standards and enforcement approach.
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Notable among these

are the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (CAA) and the FWPCA amendments of 1972.
The standards of both of these acts were to be set at a level which would
provide an "ample margin of safety" .
burden of proof was on EPA.
of benefits and costs.

In citing any permit violation, the

Furthermore, neither act required a balancing

Other acts bas ed upon the standards and enforcement

concept and enacted during the seventies include the Safe Drinking Ivater Act,
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and Title I (MPRSA).
In the late seventies, the paradi gm anomalies inherent in the standards
and enforcement approach began to appear.

Many of these anomalies, such as
a~d

a failure to meet

established deadlines were discussed earlier in this ' paper.

Revisions in the

goal modification, noncompliance, enforcement problems,

legislation aimed at alleviating the problems have had little beneficial
effect.
Policymakers are just now beginning to realize the intrinsic shortcomings
of the regulatory approach to environmental policy.

Geared towards the poli-

tical term of office, current solutions offer short-term
problems.

ans~vers

for long-term

Unfortunately, the public's political perspective does not extend

very far into the future.

Reagan's campaign question of 1984--"Are you better

off today than you were four years ago?"--typifies the mind-set of the electorate, who seem to seek placebo cures for deep-rooted diseases.

Hhile the

economic "benef I t s " of pollution are short-term, pollution associated costs ,
and pollution control associated benefits are long-term.
that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.)

(And everybody knows

It is not realized that

when immediate economic "gain" occurs at the expense of the environment, it
often results in a delayed, but significant economic decline.
lag, the majority of people do not a s s oc i a t e the two events.

Due to the time
Implementing

pollution control regulations at this point would cause an initial rise in
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costs.

Since the industry is already in a state of decline, the inclination

would be to reduce pollution control requirements even further.

Unless the

system is operating under a crisis situation, protecting the environment
takes a back seat to short-term economic gains.
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The table below shows the

relationships between the short-term and long-term cost and benefits of pollution, versus pollution control.

TABLE 2
Costs and Benefits of Pollution Versus Pollution Control Over Time

Pollution
Pollution Control

Costs

Benefits

diffuse, long-term,
delayed

focused, short-term,
immediate

focused, high shortterm costs

diffused, long-term,
delayed

This "catch 22" cycle will not be broken until the system has the capacity to
accommodate long-range planning goals.

Given the nature of the partisan

. mutual adjustment system and the inherent shortcomings of the standards and
enforcement approach, this will only occur with substantial changes to the
current system of environmental regulation.
Between 1977 and 1982, the Federal Government spent some $50 million on
wast~

water treatment plants.

From 1973 to 1980, $800 million was spent for

regional water quality planning.
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These figures do not include increased

costs of industries who were forced to install BPT and BAT pollution control
defices.

Despite this sum, water quality improvements per dollar spent has

. . 1 . 72
b een ml.nl.ma

Much of the criticism of the regulatory approach to environ-

mental protection has centered around its prohibitive costs.

Initially,

there was no mandate requiring a costs-benefits analysis in air and water
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quality issues.

In 1979, however, the chairman of the Council of Economic

Advisors issued a memorandum which declared existing water quality rules to
be "prohibitively expensive", and ordered that they be re-examined from a
cost-benefit approach.
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At the same time that industry and the Administra-

tion were screaming about the rules being too costly, environmentalists were
complaining that they were ineffective and inadequate.

Under the standards

and enforcement approach, these two points of view operate in a zero sum
situation and are diametrically opposed.

If economic growth and environmental

protection are to be sought as simultaneous (and at times symbiotic) goals,
then it is time to seek a new par adigm of environmental regulation.
I have outlined briefly here, and discussed in detail elsewhere in this
report, some of the economic, technical, and philosophical deficiencies of
the regulatory approach as exemplified in the

~vPCA

and MPRSA.

The Council

of Economic Advisors was right in its assertion that we must begin to pursue
a cost-benefit approach to environmental regulation.

Environmentalists

typically fear that cost-benefit analysis will inevitably result in a lessening of environmental regulation.

This is not the case.

Cost-benefit when

undertaken fairly and efficiently will allow society to achieve maximum pollution control benefits with minimum financial input.

Achieving this end,

however, will require creative implementation of innovative techniques.

Con-

sideration must be given to the "less exact" costs and benefits associated
with aesthetics, externalities, and foregone opportunity costs.

Considering

the problem from the perspective of jobs versus pollution is too narrow a
viewpoint, and in the end will lead to economic decline.

74

Unless the fundamental approach towards environmental protection changes,
the worst is yet to come.

Given the past track record of environmental dole-

outs, the huge national deficit, and prevalent attitudes towards big government,
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current and future administrations are not apt to hand out large government
.
.
·
grants to support
expenslve
po 1 1
utlon
contro 1 programs. 75

cial backing of the past, progress will be even slower.

Without the finanAlthough third sector

groups and the academic community have been advocating alternatives to the
standards and enforcement approach for over a decade, policymakers are just
now beginning to realize the intrinsic failure of the regulatory system. 76
The time has come for the dependence upon the standards and enforcement approach to be replaced with a greater reliance upon legislated economic incentives operating within the context of the market system.

The time has come

for a new paradigm.
Planning style cannot be considered separately from the object that is
being planned.

Rather, the normative aspects of a planning method must be

considered in a multitude of contexts. 77

As discussed earlier, rational

planning in environmental policy is important in establishing priorities,
policy alternatives, and goals.

Attempting to implement a rational, compre-

hensive policy within an incremental system, however, ignores basic political
and economic realities.

Environmental issues are too complex to be accom-

modated by rational planning.

They require analysis of complex technical

questions and a balancing of interests which in turn results in an increase
in diversity and multi-use options.
sity of planning techniques.

Planning for diversity requires a diver-

Each approach may hav e its own utility, but to

rely exclusively upon any single approach appears to be futility.
New methods don't always outright replace other paradigms,; rather, they
make available alternative methods for dealing with problems.
to be no universal solution as to the best planning method.

There appears
Perhaps what

we are rejecting is not such rational planning itself, but a total reliance
upon rational planning no matter what the implementation context.

-43-

It is the

de.ficiencies of the previous mOQQl that generate the ideas upon which the

new model is based.

Paradigm rejection is a process of continual modifica-

tion, not catastrophic reform.
perceptions of reality.

It is an evolution towards new ideas and new

At some point, however, just as man parted company

with the ape, we must part with ideas that have outlived their usefulness.
Birth of a Paradigm
Periods of paradigm crisis are always characterized by a plurality of options
and a high degree of uncertainty.

Waiting, in the old "Muskie tradition",

until some surefire answer comes along will only leave us smothering in our
own refuse.

This tendency towards inertia, even when the "surefire" answer

of the past has gone awry, is a by-product of rational planning.

The circuits

are so overloaded with the analysis of data and options that the energy
necessary for action potential is exhausted.

One should use scientific and

social data in policy analysis, but a decision must be made as to when the
information is conclusive enough to motivate an action.

If one reserves the

will to act until total agreement in the scientific community is achieved,
it will in all likelihood be too late to alleviate the problem.

Furthermore,

there is no guarantee that improved scientific information will lead to better
decisions by managers.

Biased, hidden judgements may taint both the seemingly

objective advice of scientists and the decisions of policymakers.

On top of

this, unrelated political trade-offs will affect policy formulation.
No framework to comprehensively identify the benefits and costs associated with marine pollution (or any other pollution for that matter) has
been developed.

Yet we must start

sO~lewhere

with the knowledge that our

mistakes will be improved upon along the way.

Clifford Russell from Resources

for the Future states the problem succinctly.

"I believe that the 'command

and control' approach (standards and enforcement) is exactly the wrong way to
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go bec.ause it is foc.used narrowly on aehievi n g tJ;th
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specification, solutions that we cannot be sure are best, or even good.
Further, the specifications tend to be in a form that shuts out new ideas
and imaginative solutions.
current state.'1
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They essentially freeze our knowledge in its

All of our decisions must be made to a greater or lesser

degree in a sea of uncertainty.

If a decision to change our course is not

made (which in the existentialist sense is a decision in and of itself), we
will continue to flow without direction down the status quo river to nowhere.
The approach to decision-making will to some extent determine what
options are available and which factors are indigenous to and which are
exogenous to the policy at hand.
factors to be taken into account?
defined?

To what extent are social and economic
How are costs and benefits going to be

How strong is public support and opposition to this problem, and

where does it lie?
do the unkno,Vils lie?

\~at

is the status of our scientific knowledge?

What consequences do the unknowns hold?

Where

In the current

multi-media approach to waste management, administrators are left with the
difficult task of striking a balance between competing objectives and alter. native methods and mediums of disposal.

They must minimize health risks and

environmental consequences and at the same time promote economic efficiency
and social equity.

An exclusive reliance upon rational decision-making in

such a complex analysis can be likened to an exhaustive description of the
energy and nutrient budgets of an ecosystem.

If attempted in scrupulous

detail, one would never get beyond the role of detritus--and life as a piece
of decomposing detritus is bound to be a little dull.

Policy needs a parallel

to systems ecology and the technique of ecosystem modeling.

In modeling, ke y

elements representing the functioning of an ecosystem on a particular level

are used in approximating ecosystem dynamics.
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Hithout such a process i t wouLd

be virtually impossible to conceptualize energy budgets or to predict ecosystem response to external stimuli.

Modern techniques for policy analysis

such as assigning probabilities to outcomes, improving risk assessment and
management techniques, and developing new and more encompassing methods for
cost/benefit analysis are continually being refined. 79

These techniques

designed to prioritize and weed out lesser valued options represent the
rudiments of "policy modeling".

In order to find where the deficiencies in

new theories lie, however, it is necessary to take them for a test drive.
Most of this discussion has focused upon the uncertainties associated
with policy formulation and the need to act intelligently even in the face
of uncertainty.

It should be comforting to note that there are two certain-

ties upon which "action can be based.

The first is that in both economic "and

social issues people are going to a c t in their own self-interest.

The second

surety is that the nature of the American political system, so impeccably
designed by our forefathers, is not likely to change.

In the past these two

principles have largely been ignored, and the road to environmental management
has been a continual (and therefore expensive) battle.

Designing a policy so

as to incorporate these truisms is the only sensible thing to do.

What we

must seek is a way to use the existing political infrastructure to guide the
market system in a manner which both cultures the economic self-interest of
involved parties and fosters environmental protection.
Adam Smith (1723-1790) was the progenitor of "invisible guiding hand" of
the competitive market system.

He maintained that the interplay of individual

self-interest and the voluntary exchanges of bu yers a nd sellers results in
a production and exchange of goods which benefits the public welfare.

The

underlying assumption is that a person will not pay more for a service than
it is worth to him, and that a person will not sell
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service for Jess than

without the adequate review of pertinent economic and social factors is dangerous in that someone is apt to use the figure for regulatory purposes.

105

Proposals involving per tonnage fees have already been incorporated into
Congressional legislation.

Suggested fee structures in past legislation

were $25 per dry ton the first year, $40 the second, and $55 the third.

10 6

Affected municipalities were so outraged by these figures that in later bills
. hd ra~vn. 107
t h ey were Wlt

Setting a particular fee structure is better left

to the resources and expertise of the regulating agency than to the staff of
a Congressperson.

To my knowledge, a thorough benefit-cost analysis did not

accompany these suggested figures.
Information that I have gathered has been pulled from a wide variety of
scattered sources.

It must be cautioned that due to differences in research

techniques, the results of all the studies may not be directly comparable.
Thirty different economists assigned the task of coming up with an estimation
of lost income due to the ocean dumping of municipal sludge would come up
with thirty different answers.

Nevertheless, it is hoped that the information

provided here will provide a starting point for the type of thorough benefitcost analysis that proceed the establishment of a user fee.

Since the art of

establishing user fees is in its infancy, industrial and municipal response
to the amount must be carefully monitored and adjusted accordingly.
User Fee Criteria and Associated Considerations
There are certain logistical and distributional criteria associated with
establishing a user fee framework for municipal lvaste.

Frederick Eidness,

Assistant Administrator for Water with EPA, expressed the following four
concerns:

108

1) The program must clearly state the scope of the fee system.
2) The system must be simple, efficient, and administrable, without
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creating unnecessary burdens or costs.
3) The user fee must be equitahle, fairly distributing the program
costs among all users of the program.

Cost allocation must not be

burdensome, nor allocation to any particular user unfair.
4) The system must be auditable, and must be specific enough to
eliminate any confusion re garding costs and procedures.
Developing a fee structure in accordance with the above principles will require answers to difficult questions.
costs?

Wha t will be the basis of recovered

That is, which costs will be recovered by program users and which

will not?

What system will be used to allocate the costs among users?

Will

it be based solely upon tonnage, or will other factors such as toxicity,
assimilative capacity , and use of pretreatment facilities come into play?
What minimum framework will be needed to carry out fee collection, permit
processing, rebates, etc.?

Will the permits be marketable?

restrictions will be placed on them?

Will a user fee be implemented in com-

bination with other more conventional management practices?
fees be distributed?

If so, what

How will collected

Will they be put into the General .Treasury, or will they

be distributed to those agencies bearing the program-related costs?

Despite

the adamant objections of the Administration, if externalities were factored
into user fees, what techniques would be used in evaluating their impact on
resources?

How would collected funds be returned to the affected groups?

Would there be direct payment to individuals such as commercial and recreational fishermen or beach-front bus inesses?
In all likelihood, this approach would too vague and complex to ever
approach the desired goal of distributional parity.
fee corresponding to each externality,

hO~vever,

The percentage of the

could be deposited in a fund

to be used for the management of the affected resource.
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A governing body

composed of researchers, coastal planners, economists and entrepr eneurs could
be established to oversee the grants

a~varded

under this fund.

If established

as a quasi-public agency, capital could be invested into pro gram-related
moneymaking projects.

A portion of the profits would be awarded to investors

and a portion would be returned to the account.

This could be vie\ved in much

the same light as royalties paid by oil companies to the states and to the
Federal Government.

In est ablishing such a program, great care would have

to be taken in the selection of innovative, competent, and

co~~itted

individu-

als, and in the draftin g of the by-laws governing the body.
The scope of studies funded by this account could include things like
pollution control and reduction studies, fisheries management plans, the possibilities of depuration and aquaculture projects, methods of increasing and
enhancing coastal tourism and studies relating to the opportunity costs of
having estuarine and coastal river ine waters of little or no aesthetic value.
If dumping and disposal of untreated and primary wastes from coastal

POT~v's

was to stop, for example, what would be the corresponding increase to the
value of those

waters~

recreational boating?

Could they be used for rowing and other types of
Or perhaps an improvement in water quality would pro-

mote urban waterfront development and raise the existing value of real estate.
A program of this nature could be set up within or replace the New York
Bight Apex Restoration Plan (NYBARP) proposed in H.R. 4829.

As user fees

become more extensive, such a moneymaking, pollution control body could expand
to encompass all areas of waste management.

This would be a natural extension

of the nation's multi-media approach to waste management and would promote
long-range coordinated planning.
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Sludge-Related Ocean Disposal Costs
Information presented on sludge-related disposal costs is divided into three
sections.

The first section will discuss SOlne of the possible costs asso-

ciated with e xternalities.

The second will present agency expenditures in

the areas of site designation, monit oring, research, enforcement, and permit
processing.

In the third section, expenses incurred by the municipalities

will be discussed.
Externalities:

EPA concurs with the need to shift the financial burden

109
to the shoulders of those who benefit from using the ocean as a dump. .

No

mention is made, however, of the need to assist those whose livelihood,
recreation, or sense of aesthetics is diminished by the actions of the
dumper.

This is the "quaking bog" of environmental policy and regulators

are afraid that they might wind up stuck in the mire.

It is both a politi-

cally and technically difficult task to arrive at a dollar value for resource
lost.

When dealing with externalities in an open system such as the N.Y.

Bight, with its myriad of contaminants and contaminant sources, one is faced
with the even more perplexing task of attributing a specific resource problem
to a particular contaminant and its source(s).
In this dollar conscious administration, it appears that the environment '
and aesthetics will take a back seat to economics.
out, however, the two are not mutually e xclusive.

As this paper has pointed
Quite the contrary, there

e xists a point at which our sense of aesthetics is so offended that we are no
longer willing to fork out our har d-earned cash to participate in a degraded
recreational activity.

The adventure of recreational fishing somehow loses·

its thrill when you catch a 3D-pound bass with a protruding stomach tumor.
To add insult to injury, you then have to consult your directions (courtesy
of the N.J. Department of Environmental Protection) on how to clean the fish
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so as to minimize your intake of PBB's.

People who consume large amounts of

striped bass have a 2100 chance in a million of ge t t i ng cancer.
t a bl e by EPA·lS 10·In a ml'11·lon. 110
1 eve 1 conSl. d
ere d
-accep

The risk

Recently the State

of New Jersey issued a fish advisory warning requesting that people not eat
locally harvested fish more than once a week.

111

In the New York Bight, there are three principle industries affected by
the externalities associated with ocean dumping.

These are commercial fish-

ing, recreational fishing, and ocean-related tourism.

Greater than 17 million

people within the Bight depend on these industries for their livelihood and
enjoyment. 112
shellfishing.

Currently, over 500 square miles of the Bight are closed to
113

Nonetheless, approximately 11,000 commercial fishermen har-

vest about 48 million dollars worth of seafood.

114

In turn, this fish helps

support the 4,000 people employed in the fish wholesale business and numerous
.
115
. retal· 1 d ilstrlLbutlon.
ot h ers engage d In

In Ne w Jersey, fish processing and

distribution revenues are about 2.5 times the dockside value.

116

Sportfishing within the Bight has an even larger value than commercial
fishing.

In 1979, 2.5 million fishermen fished in the waters off the N.Y./

N.J. coasts.

This is more than that of the other five coastal New England

states comb;~ ned . 117

In N
h
.J. a I
one,
t.e estimated annual expenditures attribu-

table to sportfishing are 500 million dollars.

This fi gure is based upon an

average $19.02 spent per fisherman, per trip, on items such as food, lodging,
tackle, bait, and related expenses. 118

The dockside value of the Bight's

recreational finfish catch approaches 51 million dollars, exceeding the value
of the commercial catch by about 3 million dollars.

The multipliers asso-

ciated with recreational fishing, however, far exceed those as sociated with
commercial fishing.
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In 1976, a major anoxic event occurred in the N.Y. Bight.

Although

thought to be caused primarily by natural events, the severity of the incident was e xacerbated by the presence of large quantities of municipal
was·tes. 119

Regardless of the event's causative factors, it can be used to

illustrate potential adverse economic impacts associated with an occurrence
of similar magnitude.

Immediate losses to the commercial fishing sector

including processing and marketing were estimated at 70.3 million dollars.
Projected losses over a seven-year period due to a lack of recruitment stock
were estimated at 498.6 million dollars.

120

Since the surf clam which is

primarily fished on a commercial basis was the hardest hit fishery, losses
to the commercial sector greatly exceeded the losses of recreational fishermen.

121

lars.
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The sportfishing industry suffered a loss of about 3.7 million dolImmediate and projected losses in both sectors totaled 572.7 rnil-

lion dollars.
Ocean-based tourism is another valuable Bight-dependent industry.

It·

includes such things as shoreside hotels, restaurants, marinas, gift shops,
tackle and bait stores, gas stations, etc.

The tourism and boating indus-

tries of Long Island's south shore alone are worth 460 million dollars annua 11y.

123

Add to this the real estate value of beachfront property and the

value increases dramatically.

People \vho vacation at the shore generally

do so to get away from the sights, s ound , and smells of the city.

When the

water and beach are strewn with objects of obvious sewage origin, this somehow diminishes the ocean's soothing effects.

If \vater quality is not main-

tained, people will seek alternate vacation sites, and tourism \vill suffer.
In 1976, the beaches of Long Island's south shore suffered from an invasion
of floating sludge, grease, and tar balls up to four inches in diameter.
Beaches were closed for a period of about two weeks, but the bad publicity
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resulted in a 30-50 percent decline in summer visitors. 124

Due primarily

to the beach closures, the island's economy suffered an estimated 30 million
dollars in 10sses.

125

Despite the fact that losses associated with the dis-

economics of ocean dumping during a single year approached the 600-milliondollar mark, the city seems reluctant to spend more than 100 million dollars
.
a year on po 11ut~on
contro 1 . 126
There are some instances where the externalities associated with ocean
dumping run deeper than the dockside value of fish and secondary expenditures
spent by vacationing fishermen and beach goers.
example.

Urban fishing is one such

The majority of people harvesting fish from the contamintated

waters of the Bight's rivers and shores do so not for pleasure, but out of
necessity.

These fish are harvested, for the most part, by ethnic minorities

and East Asian immigrants.

Unaware of the dangers, many of the immigrants,

accustomed to earning their living from the sea, seek to continue their same
lifestyle in the urban waters of the U.S.

Consumption of fish and shellfish

from these waters carries with it the immediate risk of illness due to
pathogenic viruses, and the health risks that come from ingesting PCB's and
other toxics in quantities over 1,000 times greater than those allowed by
EPA.

How do we place a dollar value on externalities such as these?

Do we

pursue the hardline approach of Union Carbide in the India disaster, insisting that the lives of these individuals, because their earning potential is
less, is not as valuable as that of a Wall Street executive?

If earning

power is to be the cold determinant of the value of their lives, then any
attempt to alleviate the problem can be vie'ved as only a cost.

In an in-

stance such as this, dollar values are intolerable as a measure of diseconomies.
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Similar circumstances arise

~vhen

one is attempting to place a dollar

value upon aesthetics, subtle ecosystem changes, or the extinction of a
species.

These are issues which involve philosophy, value judgements and,

at best, evasive economic criteria.
is intolerable to others.

What is tolerable to some individuals

An individual used to swimming in the clean waters

of R.I. 's south shore beaches would probably find even a walk along the beach
of Sandy Hook aesthetically displeasing.

People are willing to pay for the

knowledge that the waters of tomorr ow will be cleaner than the waters of
today, but putting a price tag on such a wish is difficult at best.
we assess the lost opportunity costs associated with such ideologies?

Ho~v

do

My

inclination is that using the dollar as the universal common denominator is
not the answer.
Agency Expenditures:
shared by several agencies.
Coast Guard.

Sludge-related ocean dumping expenditures are
Notable among these are EPA, NOAA , and the U.S.

Expenditures cover the costs of such items as permit processing,

site designation, monitoring, enforcement, abatement, and research and development.

Due to the overlapping duties of the involved ag ucies, and the

interrelated nature of many of the disposal activities, i.e., site designation, abatement, etc., categorical breakdowns of the various tasks are difficult to establish.

127

In Congressional testimony, for example, EPA testified

that twenty-nine Environmental Impac t Statements eElS's) prepared in association with the site designation process costs a tot al o f 17 million dollars. 128
Monies used in this site designation process will be used to provide disposal
sites not only for sewage sludge, but for industrial wastes and dredge spoil
as well.

Overlapping disposal costs, together with overlapping effects a r e

the principle motivating reasons behind NOAA's st ance that fees should not
be imposed only on sludge dumper s.

129
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TABLE 5
Existing and Proposed Sludge Ocean Dumping Research

FY-83

FY-84

FY-8S

Site Designation Guidance Document

lOOK

SOK

SOK

Site Characterization Reports
(106-Mi. Philadelphia)

lOOK

Chemical Waste Characterization Methods

lOOK

lOOK

Biological Waste Characterization Methods

200K

200K

Waste Characterization Gudeance Document

SOK

Hazard Assessment Prototype for lO6-Mi. Site

SOK

Bioaccumulation Test Methods

lOOK

SOK
lOOK

200K

300K

Contaminant Phase Distribution

lOOK

lOOK

Partial/Full Chronic Bioassay Methods

200K

200K

Guidance Document Hazard Assessment

lOOK

lOOK

Biomonitoring Feasibility Reports
Monitoring Methods Strategy/Plan
TOTALS
From:

FY-86

600K

EPA Research Laboratory, Narragansett, R.I.
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lOOK

· 7SK

7SK

SOK

112SK

87SK

2S0K

TABLE 6

Budget Authority, Ocean Disposal Permits.
Abatement, Control, Compliance.

1975

''<1329K

1976

1422K

1977

1318K

1978

1375K

2,363K

1979

1506K

1,476K

1980

1398K

1,409K

1981

1157K

1,114K

1982

3142K

3,138K

1983

3731K

3,717K

1984

"d~l,

235K

3,831K

*Personal communication, 4/7/84, Comptrollers General Office, EPA, Washington, D.C.
**Personal communication, Jack Ravan,
Asst. Adm. for Water, EPA, 7/9/84.
(Actual expenditure, Ocean Programs
Budget. )
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New York City's operating costs at the twelve-mile site are 4.09 million
dollars annually.

137

It is estimated that annual land disposal costs would

be about 45 million dollars and that dumping at the 106 site would be on the
order of 27 million dollars annually.

138

Operating out of the 106 site will

..
139
also require 50 million dollars in capital funds to upgrade the vessels.
Los Angeles estimates that land disposal of sludge would increase their costs

.
.
140
a 2- 9 percent lncrease.
by 4- 7 percent, an d Boston estlmates
Cost Summary:

In the preceding sections. I have highlighted some of the

principle costs associated with the externalities of ocean dumping and the
expenditures of agencies and permittees.

It should be clear to the reader at

this point that even when externalities and some research costs are excluded.
the municipalities are not paying their fair share of the management costs.
Municipalities that complied with the 1981 ban on the ocean disposal of sewage
sludge by utilizing more expensive land-based methods are, in effect, being
punished for their compliance.
Earlier in this report the reader was provided with an overview of H.R.

4829. as a means of recouping direct agency costs related to the management
of ocean sludge disposal.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that

under this bill if the direct costs of EPA permitting were allocated to the
twenty-one parties now dumping slud ge, the average cost of a permit would be

$95,000.

If NOAA and the Coast Guard chose to have EPA recoup their costs

through this program, the price of an average permit would rise to $162.000-a far cry from the current application fee of $100. 141

Before a price for a

limited user fee such as that of H.R. 4829 could be established, several
questions relating to the allocation of agreed upon costs would have to be
ironed out.

Are the costs of site designation to b e recouped during a single

year, or should the costs be assessed annually over a certain timespan?
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If

the latter is the chosen alternative, what is the expected life expectancy
of the dumpsite?

Will there be any associated maintenance costs?

Should

the agency expect to recoup its costs from the first permittee, or will it
be possible to identify the number of expected permittees and assess charges
accordingly?

The specifics of a user-fee program are best left to the

agency rule-making procedures operating under fairly stringent Congressional
guidelines.

EPA has already .be gun to consider regulatory frameworks under

°
h t operate. 142
wh lC h a user f ee ffilg
o

VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented the reader with an analysis of the judicial and
legislative histories of the ocean dumping of municipal wastes.

It specific-

ally addressed past implementation difficulties encountered by the agencies
in the administration of the TIiPCA and MPRSA.

Agency and municipal reaction

to current legislation designed to recoup the direct Federal costs associated
with the ocean disposal was also discussed.

Emphasis was placed on the

inherent weaknesses of the standards and enforcement approach towards environmental regulation.

Using developing techniques in planning theory and envi-

ronmental management, a philosophical, theoretical, economical, and practical
basis for policy change was recommended.

Pollution charges operating within

the framework of the market system were shown to be the most cost effective
means of controlling pollution.
Current legislation, while perhaps a step in the right direction, falls
short of a user fee system designed to function within the context of the
marketplace.

A policy based on consensus implies that several concessions

have been made.
ment approach.

H.R. 4829 does not diverge from the st and ards and enforceMunicipalities are just charged a little more f or the privi-

lege of being regulated.

Despite over\vhelming evidence to the contrary, the
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Federal bureaucracy cannot free itself from the re gulatory shackles of the
Muskie era.

Any user fee having the semblance of a pollution charge (market-

able or not) is viewed by agency brass as a punishment and unfair burden to
the dumper.

Without justification they consistently refuse externalities

their rightful place in the economic analysis.

They maintain that because

nobody mros the oceans, nobody has a right to charge a fee or "penalty" for
.
143
t h elr use.

Statements such as this show their lack of understanding f0 5

the basic nature of the tragedy of the commons.
with a frustration of current performance.

The impetus for change comes

During this transitional period

of paradigm development, traditional and nontraditional methods of decisionmaking will continue to exist side by side.
It must be understood that the purpose of a user fee on the ocean dumping 0-£ sludge is not to shift the emphasis back to land disposal.

In many

instances monitored ocean disposal might well be the environmentally preferable alternative.

The purpose of the fee is to bring ocean dumping into

economic parity with other alternatives, by recouping program costs and associated externalities.

No one method of disposal should be so cheap as to

discourage the development of pretreatment technolo gies, water conservation
and reuse, and economically viable and environmentally sound disposal methods.
The umbilical cord between pollution and profit must somehow be severed.

By

realizing and having to financially acount for all the "hidden costs", we
begin to see that the linear process of water procurement, water use, and
water disposal may not be as economical as first mee t s t he eye .

In New York

City and many other old northeastern cities, the method of s ewage disposal is '
essentially the same as that used dur i n g the 18th century.

Water supply and

water disposal are considered as separate, rather than integr ated systems.

Oftentimes water procurement and treatment accounts are hitlden within or
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subsidized by the city's general treasury. 144

Rate structures are set on the

basis of obtaining water with no regard for the costs of flushing it dO\Vll
the toilet.

Generally speaking, the more water one uses the cheaper the rate.

No incentives for

wa~er

conservation or reuse are provided, because people are
\~ile

not held financially accountable for the amount of water they consume.

touched upon only briefly in this paper, the problems associated with the
ocean disposal of municipal wastes cannot be considered apart from the problems
of water acquisition and use.
sludge or discharges from

User fees imposed on the ocean disposal of

POTI~'s

must somehow be established in conjunction

with rate setting for water procurement.

By allowing, or rather encouraging

ocean dumping, we make it easy for people to forget about the nature of the
problem.

It's "here today and gone tomorrow".

The initial question should

not be one of waste disposal, but one of waste reduction and utilization.
This should be the ultimate goal for any user fee established.
It is largely out of ignorance and complexity that voters a r e unable to
identify long-term benefits and costs.

As the re-election of Ronald Reagan

testifies, the electroate is only concerned \vith short-term benefits.
easy to trade a future cost for a present benefit.

It is

There is an inherent

predilection towards legislation promising immediate, and easily identifiable
gains in exchange for future costs that are complex, hard to identify, and
easily swept under the carpet.

By t h e same token, there is an inherent bias

against legislation or a politician that promises the reverse.
believe me, ask Walter Mondale.)

(If you don r t ,..- 'jJ

This shortsightedness effect is a basic

premise of economics and results in the misallocation and oftentimes irre.

bl e

tr~eva

.

comm~tment

0

f resources. 145

Going on the presumption that an enlightened and informed citizenry is
the basis for a good government, it is about time that our universities began
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to focus on a paradigm whose time has corne.

Programs which emphasize policy

and resource economics should begin to instruct students in the technical,
economic, and philosophical elements of discharge permits and similar management tools that are capable of operating within the context of the market
system.

This will facilitate improvements and refinements in the basic

"
"
h
1 ltlca 1 arena. 146
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c h ances a f success ln tepa
0

0
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Earth has been around for four billion years, yet Homo sapiens has
walked upright upon her surface for only 35,000 years.

No other creature

has ever had so much control over the planet as we have today.

Carl Sagan

has compared the age of the planet to a twenty-four hour day during which
the dinosaurs arrived on the planet at 11:59 p.m., and man at 11:59:59 p.m.
During a fraction of this second we have managed to pollute our air, rain,
rivers, and oceans.

We have destroyed our forest, contaminated our drinking

water, and have developed the capacity to annihilate every living thing on
this planet many times over.

Compared to the age of the planet, the human

race is but a flicker of light, industrial society even less.

If we do not

choose to accept the stewardship which we have inherited, we may, in a geologic fraction of a second, legislate ourselves into a cold, dark foulsmelling corner of the earth.

"And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good."
Genesis 2: 31 .
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